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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, echoing events elsewhere but to a much larger extent, 
unemployment in Wales surged to levels not previously seen in the post-war era as the 
traditional industries of coal and metal manufacture declined rapidly. The post-war decline of 
the coal industry had previously been offset by central governments’1 deployment of regional 
policies to boost manufacturing by constructing factories, awarding grants to companies 
investing in priority areas, and using regulatory instruments to direct industry to these areas.2 
However, economic turbulence throughout the UK meant that resources for regional policy 
were increasingly absent by the mid-1970s. From 1979 the government of Margaret Thatcher 
further downgraded regional policy given her ideological emphasis on reducing the level of 
state intervention.  The lessening application of regional policy coincided with worsening 
economic conditions in Wales, where employment in the steel, coal and manufacturing 
industries fell by 124,000 people between 1979 and 1983.3  
 
Despite central government’s changing priorities, the existence of an administratively 
devolved Welsh Office4 allowed some regional assistance to continue. The primary vehicle 
for Welsh Office intervention from 1976 was the Welsh Development Agency (WDA). The 
agency’s role was set out by the eponymous Act of 1975 as including: promoting Wales as a 
location for industrial development; providing finance to industry; promoting or assisting ‘the 
establishment, growth, modernisation or development of an industry’; providing and 
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managing industrial sites and premises; and, reclaiming derelict land.5 A Development Board 
for Rural Wales was also established to exercise similar functions in mid-Wales. 
 
The WDA was established as a statutory body with its own board because it was 
required to work closely with industry, a task that required different skills from those 
typically found in the civil service. According to John Morris, Secretary of State for Wales in 
the 1974-79 Labour Government, there was a need to 'go outside and bring in industry […] 
set up bodies which were arm’s length from the government and the civil service’.6 The 
WDA was a relatively small organisation, employing between 400 and 500 people at any one 
time between 1976 and 1999. However, it subsequently doubled in size to 996 people by 
2003-04,7 due to changing priorities and the increased resources available after political 
devolution. The agency was funded by the Welsh Office (and the Welsh Government8 after 
1999), supplemented by rental and sales income from its property portfolio. Annual 
expenditure generally rose above inflation, reaching £61.3 million in 1979-80, £93.8 million 
in 1987-88 and £140 million in 1998-1999 before more than doubling in the early years of 
devolution to £312.3 million by 2004-05.9  
 
Crucially, the agency retained political support from most Secretaries of State for 
Wales until 1999, as they favoured the WDA’s activities given the economic difficulties 
facing Wales.10 The exception was the mid-1990s when the less interventionist John 
Redwood was in post and the agency was suffering from reputational damage caused by 
criticism of its management culture.11 After 1999 the Welsh Government was determined to 
address economic issues, setting ambitious growth targets and vastly increasing the WDA’s 
resources. Despite such ambitions economic performance remained mixed, contributing to 
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disappointment with the agency and its merger with the Welsh Government’s civil service in 
April 2006. 
 
The WDA deserves study for two reasons. One is that despite the agency’s scale and 
profile, an assessment of its activities and impact over the entirety of its 30-year lifespan is 
not present in the literature.12 The other is that the decision by the Welsh Government to 
merge the WDA remains controversial. Calls are occasionally made by politicians and 
commentators for its reinstatement, meaning that a review of the agency’s achievements is 
timely.  
 
This chapter asks: what impact did the agency’s activities have on economic and 
social development in Wales during its thirty year existence, and what legacy did it leave for 
the future? It draws on: the WDA’s board papers as available from the UK’s National 
Archives; contemporary documentation including newspapers and official publications; and 
interviews with former agency staff and politicians, to argue that the picture is somewhat 
mixed. The WDA’s initial interventions did generate some success and create employment 
through encouraging foreign inward investment, establishing industrial premises and trading 
estates, and encouraging business start-ups and fostering their longer-term development. In 
particular, the WDA managed a comprehensive programme of land reclamation and the 
regeneration of many cities, towns and villages, transforming the environment for much of 
the population. However, the agency was less successful in encouraging a shift away from 
reliance on manufacturing towards the service sector, and its overall effectiveness declined 
from the mid-1990s.  
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1: INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 
 
Economic regeneration policies of central government throughout the post-war era 
prioritised the construction of factories on new industrial estates. By 1976 the state-owned 
Welsh Industrial Estates Corporation and its predecessors had constructed some 1.4 million 
sq. m. of floor space across seven industrial estates and 168 other sites.13 The largest estates 
were at Treforest, Hirwaun, Waterton (Bridgend), Swansea and Wrexham. All were 
transferred to the WDA in 1976 and the agency initiated a large-scale construction effort. 
Between the start of 1977 and March 1979 seven construction programmes were announced 
involving 499 factories covering some 0.2 million sq. m. These buildings were known as 
‘advance factories’ as they were constructed without confirmed tenants before being 
marketed to potential occupiers. Factories were developed throughout Wales although 68 
were located in Ebbw Vale and south Cardiff, both affected by the closure or part-closure of 
steel plants.14 Due to the lack of space in the congested valleys, large estates were constructed 
in the unlikely locations of Rassau and Tafarnaubach, bleak and windswept sites high above 
Ebbw Vale.15 By 1979, 58,900 people were employed on industrial estates or factories owned 
by the agency across 1.47 million sq. m. of floor space.16  
 
Activity increased again after the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 as the WDA 
desperately sought to create jobs against the backdrop of deep industrial recession and the 
brutal rationalisation of the steel industry in Wales and elsewhere. While the construction of 
advance factories was common throughout many parts of the UK, the influence of the Welsh 
Office enabled more factories to be built in Wales than was the case in English regions.17 
Between December 1979 and March 1980 the WDA announced the construction of 356 
factories, comprising some 0.2 million sq. m. of floor space. The scale of construction meant 
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that  64 factories were completed over one two-month period in mid-1982,18 but many were 
impossible to let given that manufacturing throughout the UK was struggling to an 
unexpected extent. High vacancy levels spurred a change in emphasis and the agency’s first 
corporate plan in 1984 marked ‘the end of the period when the majority of the agency’s 
resources were devoted to providing factories in advance of need’.19  
 
The volume of factories built then dropped drastically, from c.230,000 sq. m. in 1981-
82 to c.28,000 sq. m. by 1984–85 (see Graph 1), although increasing levels of overseas 
investment led to subsequent increases as factories were built to attract and house those 
investors. Also, factories tended to be built in locations more attractive to investors, which 
meant a shift in focus from the south Wales valleys in favour of sites closer to good transport 
links such as the M4 in south Wales, and the A55 in north Wales. By 1989-90 total floor 
space in WDA factories stood at over 1.8 million sq. m. 
 
Graph 1: WDA property activity, 1976-7 to 1989-90 (a). 
 
Note: 
6 
 
(a) Factory space data not available for 1979-80 and 1980-81. 
Source: WDA Annual Reports, various editions. 
 
Economic trends apparent throughout the UK in the mid-1980s and beyond impacted 
on the factory programme in Wales. Manufacturing became increasingly focused on 
technology as opposed to traditional assembly type operations, spurring the construction of 
high-specification Technology and Innovation centres. Four were constructed by 1985–86, 
totalling 19,000 sq. m. of floor space including one on the Deeside Industrial Estate. Other 
efforts to foster high technology included a science park at Newport and a medical 
technology centre in Cardiff.20 Crucially, the UK’s economy was shifting from 
manufacturing towards services, with correspondingly fewer investors willing to locate 
factories in Wales. However, limited effort was made to increase the supply of offices and 
other types of property more suitable for service sector occupiers. As a result, the agency’s 
portfolio was overwhelmingly comprised of standard factories, later labelled by Jim Driscoll, 
the Secretary of State’s Industrial Advisor, as ‘diarrhoea coloured boxes’.21 
 
By the 1990s the agency was moving away from direct intervention in the property 
market with this change symbolised by the absence of such data in its annual reports from 
1991-92. At the same time, political developments within the Welsh Office caused the 
agency’s estate to be broken up. While all previous Secretaries of State had been strong 
supporters of the WDA, this changed after the appointment of John Redwood in 1993. His 
free market ideology meant that he was opposed to large-scale interventions and the agency 
was instructed to sell its portfolio. As a result, the agency’s tangible assets reduced from £274 
million in 1993-94 to £89 million in 1997-98.22 The disposal programme was predicated on 
the basis that private sector developers would construct premises but they were often 
reluctant to do so. By the end of the 1990s the WDA’s former estate was largely in private 
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hands. The agency’s large scale construction programmes ceased although it still constructed 
bespoke premises for inward investors. The years following devolution in 1999 saw the 
agency construct ‘Technium’ facilities such as those at Swansea and Bangor. These were 
designed to support high technology activities but created few jobs and the programme was 
eventually cancelled.23  
 
Four periods can be identified in assessing the WDA’s construction programmes, with 
the agency’s effectiveness gradually decreasing over time. First, the late 1970s saw the 
agency continue with an approach rooted in post-war regional policy, effective given the 
continuing importance of manufacturing. Second, during the early 1980s recession the 
construction of advance factories and their subsequent occupation by manufacturing investors 
enabled jobs to be created quickly. Crucially, interventions during both periods delivered 
additional outputs as factories were constructed in locations where the private sector was 
reluctant to invest. However, during the third period of the late 1980s and 1990s the agency 
did not shift its approach from manufacturing towards services and its impact dissipated. This 
was due to: a reluctance to move away from its ‘glory days’ of constructing advance factories 
and bespoke units for overseas investors; the difficulty of intervening in the service sector 
where investors, influenced by poor perceptions as to skills and infrastructure, were often 
reluctant to locate in Wales even when suitable properties were available; and, the temporary 
refocusing of Welsh Office policies in the mid-1990s away from intervention. During the 
final period after political devolution, some property activity continued but at a relatively low 
level and met with mixed success. 
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2:  LAND RECLAMATION AND URBAN REGENERATION 
  
While the economic impacts of structural change spurred the agency to intervene 
through factory construction, such change also left a physical legacy of land made derelict by 
resource based industry such as mineral extraction and metal manufacturing. Central and 
local government paid little attention to dereliction until the Aberfan disaster of 1966, when a 
coal tip avalanched into a primary school and surrounding area, killing 116 children and 
twenty-eight adults. Large-scale land clearance programmes funded by the Welsh Office soon 
followed, with the scale of the problem illustrated by a 1975 survey that identified 2,685 
derelict sites throughout Wales.24 Forty-six per cent of these were disused spoil heaps linked 
to the mining of minerals such as slate, copper and coal, with the balance made up of disused 
mineral excavations, derelict buildings or partially derelict sites where commercial activity 
was continuing.  
 
In 1976 the WDA inherited land clearance responsibility from the Welsh Office’s 
Derelict Land Unit. The new agency planned for reclamation to be its second most resourced 
activity (after factory construction) between 1976–77 and 1981–82 and such activity 
accounted for some 20 per cent of its total allocations by 1983-84.25 Although the WDA did 
not generally carry out reclamation projects itself and instead provided grants to local 
authorities, it was responsible for the management, control and funding of the entire 
programme. When assessing sites proposed for clearance, the legacy of Aberfan meant that 
the WDA prioritised those with safety, flooding or contamination issues, followed by sites 
with potential to be reused as locations for factories or housing and, finally, those with 
potential for leisure usage or environmental enhancement.26 Annual clearance totals varied 
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(see Table 1), as a result of one or two large sites being completed in a particular year, but 
between 1978–79 and 2005-06, over 8,300 hectares were reclaimed across hundreds of sites.  
 
Table 1: Derelict land clearance funded by the WDA, 1978-9 to 2005-06 (a). 
 
Note: 
(a) … data not available 
Source: WDA Annual Reports (various editions) 
 
The varied nature and scale of derelict land was reflected in the types of projects 
carried out. In north Wales, large areas of slate tips were cleared, while mine workings 
related to lead, silver and copper were also reclaimed. Plates 1 and 2 show the results of a 
typical clearance scheme at a site leaching lead waste into rivers.27  
 
 
 
 
Year Land reclaimed 
(hectares)
Year Land reclaimed 
(hectares)
1978-9 168 1992-93 452
1979-80 580 1993-94 ...
1980-81 378 1994-95 544
1981-82 345 1995-96 400
1982-83 134 1996-97 401
1983-84 197 1997-98 202
1984-85 79 1998-99 391
1985-86 263 1999-00 189
1986-87 275 2000-01 81
1987-88 86 2001-02 248
1988-89 416 2002-03 88
1989-90 709 2003-04 132
1990-91 401 2004-05 121
1991-92 752 2005-06 281
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Plate 1: Parc Mine, Llanwrst, before reclamation. 
 
Source: WDA 
 
Plate 2: Parc Mine, Llanwrst, after reclamation, 1978. 
 
Source: WDA 
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In south-west Wales, former military installations such as ammunition depots and 
airfields were cleared while some of the most dramatic transformations took place in the 
south Wales valleys. Projects included the removal of a 120 metre high spoil tip at Bargoed,28 
as well as the clearance of a 73-hectare site at Blaina incorporating a former colliery, 
brickworks and tinworks. Much of the waste removed from sites was used for construction or 
road-building with, for example, coal waste spoil used to stabilise an extension to the 
Treforest Industrial Estate in 1982.29  
 
The scale of reclamation was such that the WDA declared in 1992 that it could ‘see 
the beginning of the end of dereliction in Wales and particularly in the Valleys’.30 As a result 
the reclamation of large sites gave way to urban regeneration where reclamation was 
combined with the provision of housing, retail, infrastructure and leisure facilities. According 
to the agency urban regeneration went ‘beyond environment and urban face-lifts to the very 
heart of the Welsh economy. It is about modernisation of towns, once the blight of dereliction 
has been removed’.31 Urban joint ventures launched in the 1990s included those in the Cynon 
Valley, Merthyr Tydfil, Rhyl and Holyhead. In Holyhead, the agency worked with local 
authorities to develop ‘an action programme of industrial and retail development, tourism, 
road and drainage infrastructure’.32 By 1991-92, 30 joint ventures existed and the agency’s 
expenditure on urban regeneration more than doubled from £11.2 million in 1991-92 to £25.8 
million in 1993-94.33 By 1996 the agency claimed that its £120 million of urban schemes had 
levered in private sector investment of £200 million, creating or safeguarding 5,000 jobs.34 
Urban regeneration, such as initiatives in the Gwynedd Slate Valleys and an Urban Village at 
Llandarcy continued as an important element of agency activity until 2006.  
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Overall, the WDA’s land reclamation activities changed the face of much of Wales 
for the better with few sites being recognisable as former industrial locations. Improvements 
were dramatic, especially once sites had been transformed into parkland or afforested areas 
and many schemes had a positive impact on the quality of life experienced by local residents. 
However, economic impact was more nuanced. Many reclaimed sites were in isolated areas 
with limited economic activity. Also, many sloped steeply and were unsuitable for 
development, meaning that less than 20 per cent of land reclaimed up to 1993 was developed. 
The WDA’s urban programmes improved many townscapes left shabby by relative economic 
decline, although regeneration by itself was never a panacea for deep seated economic issues.  
 
Importantly, the agency’s activities across both land reclamation and urban 
regeneration led to a gradual, if unquantifiable, attitudinal change in the views of those 
outside the country of Wales’ qualities as an investment location and tourist destination. 
While Nicolas Edwards, Secretary of State for Wales, could in 1985 rail against an 
‘extraordinary gulf of perception’ leading investors to ‘dismiss any venture in Wales, on the 
general assumption that [it] is a bad place […] there is nothing to be seen but decaying coal 
mines, run-down steelworks and slagheaps’,35 by 2006 dramatic examples of dereliction 
barely existed. 
 
3: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
 
As well as constructing property to be occupied by commercial investors, the WDA 
marketed Wales to such investors, the attraction of which had long been a priority in Wales.36 
In the late 1970s the agency worked with and part-funded the Development Corporation for 
Wales, a small semi-state marketing organisation active since 1957. In 1983 the corporation 
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merged with the WDA to form the agency’s WINvest (Wales Investment Location) division. 
It ran overseas offices in North America, continental Europe and the Far East from which 
agency representatives marketed Wales to potential investors. Two trends were apparent 
within the agency’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) activity. The first was its focus on 
manufacturing which the WDA was well placed to attract given that companies were looking 
for locations with the attributes offered by Wales: access to European markets; low cost 
labour; ready availability of sites and factories; good road and rail communications; and, 
grants. The other trend was that while service sector activities such as software or financial 
services were important in terms of job creation, attracting these was difficult in part due to 
poor perceptions of the skills base in Wales, subsumed in investors’ broader impressions of 
economic backwardness.  
 
The volume of investors seeking access to European markets combined with the 
effectiveness of agency operations to enable the capture of between 12 and 18 per cent of all 
UK FDI projects in the mid to late 1980s.37 Secretaries of State for Wales intervened 
enthusiastically to ensure that local authorities and trade unions worked with the WDA to 
offer a united service to potential investors, an approach known as ‘Team Wales’. By the start 
of the 1990s Wales was capturing up to 20 per cent of all UK FDI projects (see Graph 2) 
including globally significant companies such as Sony, Aiwa, Toyota, Brother and Sharp. 
Confidence was such that by 1993 the agency was discussing how an ‘appropriate target for 
the years ahead’ could be that Wales would become ‘the leading region within the European 
Community for inward investment’.38 
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Graph 2: FDI in Wales, 1984-85 to 2005-06 (a). 
 
Note: 
(a) Data prior to 1984-1985 not available. 
Source: UK Trade and Investment. 
 
However, success was short-lived. Wales dropped from attracting 14.8 per cent of UK 
projects in 1993–94 to 7 per cent in 1998-99, while its regional ranking dropped from first in 
1990–91 to sixth in 1996–97. Manufacturing investors were increasingly likely to choose 
low-tax locations in Ireland or low-wage locations in Eastern Europe, both of which also 
offered tariff free access to European markets. As well as this, FDI projects attracted to the 
UK were becoming increasingly concentrated within service sector activity, but Wales was 
struggling to attract such investment. When choosing locations, service sector investors 
emphasised skilled labour of a volume and type often not available in areas previously 
dominated by heavy industry or in sparsely populated rural districts. While locations such as 
Cardiff were able to attract this type of investment, other areas struggled. As a result, 73 per 
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cent of FDI projects in Wales were in manufacturing in 1998, compared to 49 per cent 
throughout the UK.  
 
Ironically, at the same time as manufacturing FDI was declining, it reached its 
symbolic peak with the 1996 announcement of the Lucky Goldstar (LG) project in Newport. 
LG was a South Korean electronics conglomerate that planned to construct a semiconductor 
plant and a consumer electronics factory, forecast to create over 6,000 jobs.39 It was hailed as 
a crowning achievement and was awarded a large package of financial support, but the 
semiconductor plant failed to open and the consumer electronics plant had closed by 2006 
when remaining production was transferred to Poland.40 The high-profile failure of LG acted 
to discredit FDI as a solution for problems facing the Welsh economy with, for example, First 
Minister Rhodri Morgan describing the failure as a ‘classic example of [the WDA] putting 
too many eggs in one basket’.41  
 
Contemporary political criticism of FDI’s impact focused on four issues. First, the 
degree to which such investment was sufficient to fill the jobs gap created by 
deindustrialisation was queried, given the small totals of jobs created when compared to the 
number of unemployed. While FDI created or safeguarded an annual average of 7,363 jobs 
between 1984-85 and 1994-95, average annual unemployment stood at 127,918 people.42 
Second, the specialisation of many factories in assembly type activities meant that higher 
skilled and better-paid jobs, such as research and development, were often absent. Third, 
many of the new jobs were part time posts geared towards females, meaning that those who 
had lost their jobs in the male dominated coal and steel industries were not necessarily being 
re-employed. Finally, data quoted as evidence of success referred to announcements of 
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estimated future employment, as per central government guidelines. No data exists as to the 
numbers of people actually employed by announced projects.  
 
Despite such criticism, the investment attracted by the WDA was highly beneficial to 
Wales and factories operated by well-established multinationals did bring large scale benefits, 
both in terms of local employment and supply chain impact. Crucially, foreign firms in Wales 
tended to be larger, more productive and higher paying than domestic firms.43 The position of 
Wales as a leading FDI location was a significant achievement, something which was in no 
small part due to the effectiveness of the WDA, though the agency did over-prioritise 
manufacturing FDI and was too slow to respond to its decline. This in part reflected difficulty 
in attracting service sector investment with workforce skills often biased towards resource-
based or manufacturing activity. 
 
4: INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT 
 
The provision of loan and equity finance to companies was a priority throughout the 
UK in the 1970s, as evidenced by central government’s establishment of a National 
Enterprise Board in 1975. The WDA was tasked with providing such support in Wales and it 
aimed to fill what had long been considered to be a gap; the perceived reluctance of banks 
and other finance providers to lend to viable businesses. The agency was granted powers to 
invest in companies, including those within areas covered by the Development Board for 
Rural Wales, and saw its role as supporting ‘smaller and medium sized enterprises, 
particularly in high risk situations’.44 By 1978-79 the WDA’s investment portfolio comprised 
£7.6 million across 80 companies.45 Investments were almost always in traditional 
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manufacturing operations, with the largest being a £2 million transaction with P. Leiner and 
Sons, a gelatine manufacturer in Treforest.46  
 
However, while identifying investment opportunities overlooked by the private sector 
was simple in theory, it was far more difficult in practice. The WDA expected its overall 
portfolio to be profitable and in 1978 the Welsh Office instructed that the agency should 
achieve a specified rate of return on its investment capital.47 Aspirations soon collided with 
reality and overall losses were recorded instead. Leiner’s collapse in 1980 caused further 
difficulties, especially given that the agency’s commercial director at the time of the decision 
to invest subsequently joined the company as a director.48 The agency’s reputation was 
tarnished, with the Welsh Office subsequently insisting on signing off all investments over £1 
million and resources were redirected to factory construction. As a result, WDA investments 
dropped from £8.6 million in 1978-79 to £0.9 million in 1980-81.49 
 
The mid-1980s did see an upturn in investment levels in part due to the agency’s 
Chief Executive, David Waterstone. He felt that there was insufficient private sector capital 
to support business often due to the City of London perceiving Wales as backward.50  
By mid-1985 the agency was portraying itself as a ‘leading source of venture capital’ and was 
striving to attract investment from London-based venture capital funds. It supported 300 
companies between 1981–82 and 1984–85, providing finance totalling some £24 million.51 
Other companies were also assisted to pitch ideas to commercial funders, with 67 being 
helped to obtain funding in 1981-82.52 High levels of investment were maintained and, by 
1991, the agency had an investment portfolio of £31.5 million across 1,021 companies.53 The 
focus remained manufacturing, although investment in the service sector did grow from just 
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5.1 per cent of investments in 1980-81, to 16.2 per cent in 1986-1987 and 23.9 per cent in 
1992–93.54  
 
Despite optimism, difficulties continued. In 1981 the Welsh Office set targets of 
achieving a return at least equivalent to the cost of central government borrowing over a 
rolling five-year period. However, the WDA failed to meet this target between 1983–84 and 
1989–90. Rates of return were negative between 1983-84 and 1988-89 while 19 businesses in 
receipt of investment failed in 1984-85, incurring losses to the agency of £1.76 million.55 By 
1986-87 the target was downgraded to breaking even but even this proved impossible. The 
difficulty of identifying viable projects was symbolised by the agency’s Cardiff Consortium 
project, which aimed to market funds from a variety of commercial providers. After its 1986 
launch, 844 enquiries for information were received and 144 proposals were submitted. Of 
these, only 10 per cent were judged as having potential but none obtained funding and the 
agency noted that their quality was ‘too low’.56  
 
At the end of the 1980s the agency took a ‘new, more commercially orientated 
approach to investing’ rather than ‘operating as the lender of last resort’,57 accepting that it 
was ‘difficult, if not impossible’ to invest in start-up or early stage businesses and ‘make a 
positive return’. Its investments reduced in scale and the agency made an overall profit ‘for 
the first time ever’ in 1989–90.58 Despite this partial change in fortunes, difficulties continued 
and activity began to decrease in the early 1990s. The agency finally withdrew from 
investment activity in 1994–95, spurred by the difficulties of identifying successful 
investments as well as John Redwood’s ideologically driven desire to scale back all forms of 
state intervention.  
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However, devolution led to a policy reversal and a new body, Finance Wales, was 
established in 2001 as an agency subsidiary. Finance Wales’ Chief Executive described its 
role as bridging the ‘sometimes narrow’ gap between what new and small firms need to start 
or to expand and what was currently available from conventional funding sources.59 It also 
provided management support, particularly that which enabled business to grow, while 
managing a Wales Spinout Fund designed to support companies emerging from academia.60 
By 2005–06 Finance Wales had invested some £26 million in over 90 companies and 
although it was recording successes with individual investments, limited data availability 
meant that the extent to which it was succeeding in its overall mission was unclear. 
 
While the WDA’s investments did increase commercial activity, they were financially 
unsuccessful in overall terms. If neither commercial providers nor the WDA could find 
enough viable projects, it is likely that they did not exist in any volume. Also, the failure of 
investments such as Leiner highlighted the difficulties faced by the agency. It acted as a 
lender of last resort, making losses to the public purse inevitable but these were politically 
unacceptable by the 1980s during an era of downward pressure on public expenditure. 
Despite this, the volume of activity meant that some investments did effectively support 
successful businesses although the extent of this cannot be quantified. Crucially, the WDA 
saw its investments as not only supporting businesses but also building confidence, and so it 
was prepared to absorb losses to increase ‘levels of commercial spirit’ and employment.61 
 
5: BUSINESS SUPPORT 
 
The provision of advisory services to businesses, eventually to become the WDA’s 
primary focus, had modest beginnings. In the late 1970s advisors from its Small Business 
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Advisory Unit visited companies and provided advice across advertising, exporting and 
financial support. In 1978-79 the unit expanded, taking over central government’s 
Counselling Service and annually providing 2,000 business counselling sessions and visiting 
over 5,000 small business by 1981-82 (see Table 2). Activities included the identification of 
contracting opportunities offered by public sector bodies.62   
 
Table 2: Business support, 1977-78 to 1987-88. 
 
Note: 
(a) Activity did not commence until 1979-80. 
Source: WDA Annual Reports, 1977-78 to 1987-88. 
 
The WDA’s business support activities grew throughout the 1980s as the dangers of over-
dependence on manufacturing and extractive industries became apparent. Encouraging 
indigenous businesses was seen as way of offsetting this over-dependence, and the agency 
encouraged unemployed people to start their own businesses. The agency also educated those 
about to enter the workforce as to the benefits of running their own business, with activities 
including a Young Initiative Programme presented to 315 groups in 1988-89. Finally, the WDA 
Advisory 
visits
Business 
counselling 
sessions (a)
1977-78 2,750 …
1978-79 2,981 …
1979-80 3,910 485
1980-81 4,605 736
1981-82 5,250 2,006
1982-83 5,142 3,170
1983-84 4,890 3,661
1984-85 6,024 5,395
1985-86 7,091 6,689
1986-87 7,746 7,698
1987-88 9,765 8,365
1988-89 11,994 8,831
1989-90 13,327 10,042
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wanted to create greater numbers of high technology businesses, launching its Wales 
Investment and Technology (WINtech) division in 1984. WINtech encouraged businesses to 
profit from new technology, stimulated links between industry and academia and promoted the 
growth of high-technology companies.63 Activities included a product development service to 
connect investors with companies in need of funding and the creation of higher education 
research centres. However, WINtech struggled to achieve measurable impact and a 1986 
review noted its inability to ‘stamp its presence firmly on the Welsh scene’.64 
 
Business support intensified further in the 1990s, with the agency’s Chief Executive 
arguing in 1990 that while inward investment was ‘welcome […] the engine of recovery in 
Wales in fact lies in the resurgence and diversification of the small and medium business 
sector’.65 By 1991-92 the Business Development Unit had merged with WINtech to form the 
Business Support Division, the agency’s largest division. Increased resources led to 
expansion in the volume and nature of activities, now characterised by a complex, project 
driven approach. By the early 1990s support was provided across: European issues; 
technology; supplier development; and, skills development. Within European issues, projects 
included centres providing information on tendering opportunities, grant programmes and 
European legislation. Technology activities included the ‘Competitive Strategy Review’ 
project, which aimed to assist companies to access advanced production technologies. 
Supplier Development programmes included ‘Source Wales’, which identified supply 
opportunities within overseas-owned plants that could be serviced by Welsh-based 
companies. By 1993-94 some £80 million of supply opportunities had been identified, while 
ten supply company associations had been formed to spread best practice.66 Skills 
development programmes included management training and a range of other conferences 
and courses.  
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While the WDA had previously tended to concentrate on industrial areas, a ‘Rural 
Prosperity Programme’ was launched in 1991-92 to broaden the agency’s foci of activity. 
Projects included the creation of local development agencies in areas such as south 
Pembrokeshire while a Welsh Food Promotions company was established as an agency 
subsidiary in 1992. The remainder of the 1990s saw growth across the scale and complexity 
of business support. Much of this was attributable to the increasing volume of European 
funding with, for example, Wales receiving £146.5 million in 1993.67 This encouraged 
complexity given that such funding was delivered through hundreds of projects loosely 
grouped into thematic programmes used by the European Commission to prioritise business 
support. Attempts were made to knit these strands together, most notably in 1996 by a 
Regional Technology Plan that drew on responses from 600 organisations to ‘develop a 
consensus [...] on a strategy to improve the innovation and technology performance of the 
Welsh economy’.68 The WDA incorporated the plan’s contents into its programmes, although 
the mechanisms by which this took place and their effectiveness are unclear.  
 
The early years of the twenty-first century saw further increases in business support. 
Attempts to move towards a more knowledge based economy were common, including 
'Know-How' Wales, an initiative that sought to commercialise research by introducing 
businesses to academic partners. By 2003–04 the agency was claiming to have facilitated 
some 770 collaborations between industry and academia.69 Advisory services were also 
overhauled, with the WDA being tasked in 2003 to introduce and manage the ‘Business Eye’ 
service, which was responding to some 25,000 enquiries per year by 2005–06.70 A greater 
focus on entrepreneurship was also apparent, most notably through the delivery of activities 
under the Entrepreneurship Action Plan. 
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Between 1976 and 2006 business support moved from being a relatively marginal 
priority to the agency’s central activity. Despite this, Garel Rhys, a WDA board member in 
the 1990s stated that ‘we never found the silver bullet, we never even found a bronze bullet to 
engage the SMEs in what was happening or to really increase the numbers’.71 Overall, the 
intangible nature of some agency activities such as providing advice and information to 
companies means that measuring their impact is difficult, problems mirrored across the UK.  
 
6: ASSESSING IMPACT  
 
Assessing the impact of historic activities within economic development is 
challenging. While it is often assumed that official data enables such activities and their 
impacts to be quantified and evaluated, this is often not the case. Problems arise due to the 
lack of comparable and reliable data-sets necessary for such assessments, and the difficulty of 
retrospectively reassembling such data sets.  In theory, four methodologies are available to 
measure impact. These are: contemporary evaluations; agency output data; economic 
convergence or divergence; and, informal assessment based in part on contemporary opinion. 
This section examines the availability and reliability of data on the agency’s performance and 
outlines how the lack of such data largely precludes the use of the first three methodologies. 
It then uses the fourth method, informal assessment based in part on contemporary opinion, to 
provide an assessment of the WDA’s impact.  
 
 The first methodology (contemporary evaluations) would summarise agency studies 
that fully assessed the economic and employment impact of its activities.72 However, the bulk 
of agency activity was not subjected to such analysis, which was not adopted widely by the 
UK’s public sector until after 2000. Some evaluations were commissioned in the mid-1990s 
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of activities such as urban regeneration but used varying methodologies and are not generally 
present in the archives. All suffered from what the WDA referred to as a ‘paucity of 
monitoring and output information’,73 reflecting poor management. The lack of evaluations 
was noted in 1991 by central government’s National Audit Office, which reported that the 
programmes carried out by agencies including the WDA ‘had resulted in substantial numbers 
of new jobs being created’ but that the agencies stated that they ‘cannot assess the extent to 
which these initiatives have influenced […] the labour market’. This inability to evaluate 
impact was caused by the Welsh economy being ‘subject to many influences outside their 
responsibility’. The National Audit Office concluded that it was ‘therefore very difficult to 
evaluate the full success of these initiatives’.74  
 
The second approach focuses on data published by the WDA. From 1990-91 it 
published figures for the number of jobs claimed as being created or safeguarded by its 
activities, while data on inward investment, private capital investment and business secured 
for Welsh companies are available from the mid-1990s. At first glance, data on jobs created 
or safeguarded are impressive, especially during the early years of the twenty-first century 
with a remarkable 52,900 jobs being recorded in 2003-04 (see Graph 3). 
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Graph 3: Jobs claimed as created or safeguarded by agency activities, 1990-91 to 2005-
2006 (a). 
 
Source: WDA Annual Reports, 1990-91 to 2005-2006. 
 
Despite these data, there is no guarantee that these outcomes either took place or if 
they did, that they were a direct result of WDA activity. At the same time, the passage of time 
and the complexity and scale of the agency’s activities precludes any realistic retrospective 
allocation. Also, some jobs were double counted by different agency departments. For 
example, the WDA may have reclaimed a site and built a factory, before attracting an 
overseas investor. Different departments undertook these activities, each of which could 
count jobs created. These management problems were later summarised by Brian Morgan, 
the agency’s Chief Economist in the 1990s, in the following words: ‘the monitoring of jobs 
was so haphazard […] property was counting jobs, inward investment was counting jobs, so 
jobs created and safeguarded, were just almost meaningless numbers by the mid-90s.’75 
 
The third approach, that of convergence or divergence, proposes that if interventions 
were successful, then the economic indicators for Wales would gradually converge with those 
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of the UK. This approach was often used by politicians as it offered simplicity and the ability 
to choose data to suit different agendas, with the WDA’s Chief Executive stating in 1990 that 
‘almost anything can be proved with statistics, often by using the very simple device of 
changing the start date of a series’.76 As a result, different measures can be used to draw 
contrasting conclusions. A positive argument for some years could be based on measures 
such as FDI and manufacturing productivity, while a negative case could focus on how 
unemployment was usually higher than the UK average, while economic output per head 
remained relatively low. A second disadvantage is additionality. If performance is 
converging, this may be due to reasons aside from intervention such as a favourable resource 
endowment or an existing concentration in growth sectors. Conversely, if a region is 
diverging, it can be argued that such trends would have been worse without intervention.  
 
The difficulties of applying the first three methodologies imply that the complexities 
of evaluation are such that an accurate quantification of the WDA’s economic impact is 
impossible. As a result, this chapter uses the final methodology, of informal assessment based 
in part on contemporary opinion.  
 
A starting point is the retrospective views of senior opposition politicians on the 
WDA’s performance before political devolution in 1999. Importantly, the opposition status of 
these politicians meant that they had no vested interests in praising the WDA. As an example, 
Rhodri Morgan, Labour MP for Cardiff West from 1987, frontbench spokesman for Wales in 
the early 1990s and the Welsh Government’s First Minister between 2000 and 2009, strongly 
criticised the WDA’s management throughout the 1990s and in 2004 took the decision to 
disband the agency.  
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Despite their opposition status, three senior politicians were able to point to some 
successes although their assessments were balanced by criticism. Ron Davies, Labour MP for 
Caerphilly from 1983 and Shadow Secretary of State in the 1990s, surmised that ‘we would 
be in a worse state had we not had these [interventions]. But at the same time [as attracting 
FDI] we should have been saying either, how can we grow our own industry, our own 
indigenous industry?’ Rhodri Morgan argued that ‘I thought it [the WDA in the 1980s] was 
very effective in a short term sense. You want branch factories to act as a patch to staunch the 
rise in unemployment […] but a vision of where Wales would be in fifteen or twenty or 
twenty five years [..] it wasn’t there’. Finally, Dafydd Wigley, Plaid Cymru MP for 
Caernarfon from 1974 and party president (1980-1984, 1991-2000), suggested that ‘the 
successes must be in terms of the bringing in overseas investment [but] perhaps not enough 
was done to attack the needs of industry and commerce, and […] the element of 
entrepreneurship’.77  
 
As for informally assessing activity by type, factory construction helped to attract 
large volumes of manufacturing, with much activity being additional given that the private 
sector was often unwilling to construct factories. However, manufacturing investment was 
decreasing by the 1990s and insufficient attention was paid to the role of property in 
stimulating service sector investment. Land reclamation was hugely successful, not just in 
terms of improving the environment, but also in changing the public face of much of Wales 
as an investment location and tourist destination while urban regeneration had a positive 
impact on many townscapes. Such activity would not have taken place without the WDA’s 
financial support although direct economic impact was limited. Inward investment was also 
successful as Wales needed large numbers of jobs quickly and FDI presented an obvious 
opportunity. Despite successes, FDI was never going to be attracted in sufficient volume to 
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entirely offset deindustrialisation. At the same time, much of Wales' success as an investment 
location was due to a short-lived combination of circumstances, although the WDA expertly 
exploited these.  
 
However, other interventions were less successful. Industrial investment met with 
mixed results. The agency struggled to identify profitable opportunities, although this reflects 
a relative lack of such opportunities rather than failings on the agency’s part. Finally, 
assessing the impact of the business support activities is virtually impossible, given the lack 
of contemporary evaluations and the difficulty of measuring the impact of intangible 
activities such as advisory services given to thousands of individual companies. It is likely 
that such services assisted some companies to grow but these impacts cannot be quantified. 
 
In conclusion, the WDA successfully created some positive economic impacts. It was 
effective within manufacturing but struggled to achieve impact within the service sector. 
Overall, it is probable that if the agency had not intervened, the Welsh economy would have 
been in a significantly worse state. The agency was effective over its first two decades,78 as it 
could respond to market demand and focus on tangible outputs. As a result, the WDA often 
played an important role in securing some economic modernisation.79 However, once the 
focus of intervention shifted to services by necessity, the agency found it difficult to achieve 
measurable impact. While some of this difficulty was attributable to how Wales had always 
struggled to develop a more services-based economy, the agency could have made greater 
efforts to adapt its activities earlier and develop a stronger approach to long-term planning. 
As well as this, governance problems in the early 1990s also impacted on the agency’s 
reputation and subsequent effectiveness.  
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Despite these difficulties, it is important not to be overly critical. Many service sector 
activities were more responsive to interventions in areas such as skills and technological 
infrastructure than was the case for manufacturing, but the agency had little influence in such 
areas. At the same time, public sector organisations throughout the UK and elsewhere 
struggled with how greater levels of indigenous business could be created. The agency’s 
effectiveness dissipated as economic change continued throughout the 1990s and beyond, 
while the dramatic increases in funding after 1999 created a bloated organisation lacking in 
focus. This ultimately contributed to political disappointment and the dissolution of the 
agency in April 2006 as the over-ambitious economic ambitions of the Welsh Government 
proved difficult to deliver.  
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